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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a decision-maker who tries to learn the distribution of outcomes from
previously observed cases. For each observed sequence of cases, the decision-maker entertains
a set of priors expressing his hypotheses about the underlying probability distribution. We
impose a version of the concatenation axiom introduced in BILLOT, GILBOA, SAMET AND
SCHMEIDLER (2005) which insures that the sets of priors can be represented as a weighted
sum of the observed frequencies of cases. The weights are the uniquely determined similarities
between the observed cases and the case under investigation.
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11 Introduction
How will existing information inﬂuence probabilistic beliefs? How does data enter the induc-
tive process of determining a prior probability distribution? KEYNES (1920) discusses in great
detail the epistemic foundations of probability theory. In particular, in Part III of his "A Trea-
tise on Probability", he critically reviews most of the then existing inductive arguments for
this probability-generating process. One can view the approach of BILLOT, GILBOA, SAMET
AND SCHMEIDLER (2005) as an attempt to model this inductive process with the concept of a
similarity function, covering both Bayesian and frequentist arguments.
The frequentist approach and the Bayesian belief-based approach to probability theory use
available information differently. Both approaches lead, however, to similar statistical results if
data is derived from statistical experiments, which are explicitly designed to obtain control over
the data-generating process. Classical examples are urn experiments where balls of different
colors are drawn from urns with unknown proportions of balls with different colors.
Statistical experiments represent an ideal method of data collection. In this case, decision mak-
ers can aggregate information directly in a probability distribution over unknown states. In-
deed, in this context, it is of little consequence whether one follows a frequentist or a Bayesian
approach. Both approaches will lead to the same probability distribution as more evidence
becomes available with an increasing database.
Inmostreal-lifedecision problems, however, decision makersdonothaveavailabledataderived
from explicitly designed experiments. Usually, they face the problem to predict the outcome of
an action based on a set of data which may be more or less adequate for the decision problem
under consideration. This requires aggregating data with different degree of relevance. The
case-based decision making approach of GILBOA AND SCHMEIDLER (2001) offers a system-
atic way to deal with this information aggregation problem: to evaluate an action, the outcomes
of past observations are summed up, weighted by their perceived degree of relevance, their
similarity to the current decision situation.
2In a recent paper, BILLOT, GILBOA, SAMET AND SCHMEIDLER (2005), henceforth BGSS
(2005), show that, under few assumptions, a probability distribution over outcomes can be
derived as a similarity-weighted average of the frequencies of observed cases. Moreover,
GILBOA, LIEBERMAN AND SCHMEIDLER (2004) demonstrate how one can estimate the sim-
ilarity weights from a given database.
The case-based approach in BGSS (2005) associates adatabase with a singleprobability distri-
bution. This appears reasonable if the database is large and if the cases recorded in the database
are clearly relevant for the decision problem under consideration. Indeed, BGSS (2005) note
also that this approach
"... might be unreasonable when the entire database is very small. Speciﬁcally, if there
is only one observation, [....] However, for large databases it may be acceptable to assign
zero probability to a state that has never been observed." (BGSS (2005), p. 1129)
In order to deal with this problem it appears desirable to choose an approach which allows us
to include some notion of ambiguity about the probability distribution associated with a given
database. For small and heterogeneous databases ambiguity may be large, while it may vanish
for large and homogeneous databases. The multiple-prior approach to decision making offers
a framework which captures such ambiguity. Even if a decision maker considers a probabil-
ity distribution as most likely based on the information contained in the data, there may be
probability distributions which the decision maker may not want to rule out completely. For
example, a decision maker may not trust the information that balls are drawn from an urn with
equal numbers of black and white balls. Based on a database consisting of three draws yielding
one "black" and two "white" balls, the decision maker may feel ambiguity about whether the
probability is 0.5 for the two colors or whether there is a higher probability of a "white" draw.
This ambiguity may shrink as the data base gets larger and one can be more conﬁdent that the
proportions of "black" and "white" draws reﬂect the actual probabilities.
In this paper we modify the approach of BGSS (2005) such that it is possible to consider the
weight of increasing evidence. Given a database, we model ambiguity about the most likely
probability distribution by a set of probability distributions. We relax the main axiom of BGSS
3(2005), Concatenation, to capture the idea that small data-sets may represent more ambiguous
information about the actual probability distribution. At the same time, our modiﬁcation main-
tains the main property ofthe representation derived in BGSS (2005): the similarity function is
unique and independent of content and size of the data-set. In a second step, we assume that the
conﬁdence of the decision maker increases as data accumulates and that the set of probability
distributions converges to the observed frequency when the data-set becomes large.
As in BGSS (2005), the question remains open which decision criterion one should use given
the information contained in a set of multiple priors. In order to obtain a decision rule together
with a multiple prior representation one may embed these ideas in a behavioral model in the
spirit of GILBOA, SCHMEIDLER & WAKKER (2002) or derive decision criteria reﬂecting de-
grees of optimism or pessimism in the face of ambiguity as in the work of COIGNARD AND
JAFFRAY (1994) and GONZALES AND JAFFRAY (1998).
GONZALES AND JAFFRAY (1998) model preferences over Savage-type acts for a given set of,
possibly imprecise, data. They derive a representation of preferences in form of a linear com-
bination of the maximal and minimal potential outcome of an act and its expected utility with
respect to the observed frequency of states. The weights attached to the maximal and minimal
outcomes can be interpreted as degrees of optimism and pessimism. They decrease over time
relative to the weight attached to the expected utility part of the representation. Because obser-
vations may be imprecise a decision maker associates with a set of data a set of priors centered
around the observed frequency. The size of the set of probabilities depends negatively on the
amount of data.
While we do not derive a decision rule from behavior, our approach encompasses a richer class
of situations which allow for, but is not restricted to, the case of controlled statistical experi-
ments considered in both COIGNARD AND JAFFRAY (1994) and GONZALES AND JAFFRAY
(1998). The concept of similarity allows us to consider also inhomogeneous data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section
3 provides some motivating examples. In Section 4 we state the axioms and derive the main
4representation result. An example in Section 5 illustrates the properties of this representation.
Section 6 deals with the special case of data collected in controlled experiments and Section 7
concludes the paper. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The basic element of a database is a case which consists of an action taken and the outcome
observed together with information about characteristics which the decision maker considers
as relevant for the outcome. We denote by X a set of characteristics, by A a set of actions,
and by R a set of outcomes. All three sets are assumed to be ﬁnite. A case c = (x;a;r) is an
element of the ﬁnite set of cases C = X × A × R. A database of length T is a sequence of
cases indexed by t = 1...T:
D = ((x1;a1;r1),...,(xT;aT;rT)) ∈ C
T.
The set of all data-sets, denoted by D : = ∪
T≥1
CT, is the set of databases of any length T ∈ Z+.
Consider a decision maker with a given database of previously observed cases, D, who wants
to evaluate the uncertain outcome of an action a0 ∈ A given relevant information about the
environment described by the characteristics x0 ∈ X. We will assume that the decision maker
associates a set of probability distributions over outcomes R,
H (D | x0;a0) ⊂ ∆
|R|−1,
with the action a0 in the situation characterized by x0 given the database D ∈ D. Formally,
H : D×X × A→∆|R|−1 is a correspondence which maps D×X × A into compact and convex
subsets of ∆|R|−1.
We interpret H (D | x0;a0) as the set of probability distributions over outcomes which the de-
cision maker takes into consideration given the database D. In applications one may think of
this set of probabilities as a neighborhood of the frequencies of relevant observations in D.
With such applications in mind, the assumption that H (D | x0;a0) is a compact and convex
subset of ∆|R|−1 appears reasonable. Elements of this set are denoted by h(D | x0;a0) and we
write hr (D | x0;a0) for the probability assigned to outcome r by the probability distribution
5h(D | x0;a0).
Notice that these probabilities over outcomes depend both on the action a0 and the charac-
teristics x0 of the situation under consideration. In this paper, we will focus on how a deci-
sion maker evaluates data in a given decision situation (x0;a0). Hence, the decision situation
(x0;a0) will mostly remain ﬁxed. For notationalconvenience, wewill therefore often drop these
variablesandwritesimplyH(D), h(D) andhr(D)instead ofH (D | x0;a0), h(D | x0;a0), and
hr (D | x0;a0), respectively.
3 Motivating Examples
The following examples illustrate the broad ﬁeld of applications for this framework. They will
also highlight the important role of the decision situation (x0;a0).
The ﬁrst example is borrowed from BGSS (2005).
Example 3.1 Medical treatment
A physician must choose a treatment a0 ∈ A for a patient. The patient is characterized by a set
of characteristics x0 ∈ X, e.g., blood pressure, temperature, age, medical history, etc. Observ-
ing the characteristics x0 the physician chooses a treatment a0 based on the assessment of the
probability distribution over outcomes r ∈ R. A set of cases D observed
4 in the past may serve
the physician in this assessment of probabilities over outcomes.
A case is a combinations of a patient t’s characteristics xt, treatment assigned at and outcome
realization rt recorded in the database D. Given the database D, the physician considers a set
of probabilities over outcomes, H (D | x0;a0) ⊂ ∆|R|−1, as possible. These probability distrib-
utions represent beliefs about the likelihood of possible outcomes after choosing a treatment a0
for the patient with characteristics x0.
A different ﬁeld of applications are recommender systems which become increasingly popular
in internet trade. Internet shops often try to proﬁle their customers in order to provide them with
4 The "observations" of cases are not restricted to personal experience. Published reports in scientiﬁc
journals, personal communications with colleagues and other sources of information may also provide
information about cases.
6individually tailored recommendations. Our second example shows how an internet provider of
a movie rental system can be modelled with this approach.
Example 3.2 Recommender system of an internet movie rental shop
Consider a consumer who logs into the internet shop of a movie rental business. The customer
is associated with a set of characteristics x0 ∈ X which may be more or less detailed depending
on whether she is a new or a returning customer. The recommender system of the shop has to
choosewhichcategoryof moviesa0 torecommendtothis customer. Theremaybemanydifferent
categories in an actual recommender system. In this example, we will distinguish, however, only
the genre of the movie and the most preferred language of the customer, i.e.,
A = {Comedy, Documentary, Romance} × {English, German}.
The outcome of the recommendation could be whether rental agreement will result or not, r ∈
R = {success, no success}.
Therecommender systemis built on a databaseD containing records of customers with aproﬁle
of characteristics xt who had been successfully offered a movie at ∈ A. Given this database
D the system assesses the likelihood H (D | x0;a0) of the customer x0 renting a movie from
the suggested category a0. The set of probability distributions over R, H (D | x0;a0), which
are taken into consideration reﬂects the degree of conﬁdence with respect to this customer.
For a new customer, conﬁdence may be low and the set of probabilities H (D | x0;a0) large.
Alternatively, if there are many observations for a returning customer in the database, the set
H (D | x0;a0) may be small, possibly even a singleton.
As a ﬁnal case we will consider a classic statistical experiment where the decision maker bets
on the color of the ball drawn out of an urn.
Example 3.3 Lotteries
Consider three urns with black and white balls. There may be different information about the
composition of black and white balls in these urns. For example, it may be known that
• there are 50 black and 50 white balls in urn 1,
• there are 100 black or white balls in urn 2,
• there is an unknown number of black and white balls in urn 3.
7We will encode all such information in the number of the urn, x ∈ X = {1;2;3}.
In each period a ball is drawn from one of these urns. A decision maker can bet on the color
of the ball drawn, {B;W}. Assume that a decision maker knows the urn x0 from which the ball
is drawn, when he places his bet a0. An action is, therefore, a choice of lottery a ∈ A :=
{1B0;1W0}, with the obvious notation 1E0 for a lottery which yields r = 1 if E occurs and
r = 0 otherwise.
Suppose the decision maker learns after each round of the lottery the result and the urn from
which the ball was drawn. Since there are only two possible bets a = 1B0 or a′ = 1W0 we can
identify cases c = (x;a;r) by the urn x and the color drawn B or W. Hence, there are only six
cases
C = {(1;B);(1;W);(2;B);(2;W);(3;B);(3;W)}.
Supposethat, afterT rounds, thedecision-makerhasadatabaseD = ((1;B);(3;W);...;(2;B)) ∈
CT.
With each database D, one can associate a set of probability distributions over the color of the
ball drawn {B;W} or, equivalently, over the payouts {1;0} given a bet a. Suppose a decision
maker with the information of database D has placed the bet a0 = 1B0 and learns that a ball
will be drawn from urn 2, then he will evaluate the outcome of this bet based on the set of
probability distributions H (D | 2;a0). This set should reﬂect both the decision maker’s infor-
mation contained in D and the degree of conﬁdence held in this information. For example, as
in statistical experiments, the decision maker could use the relative frequencies of B and W
drawn from urn 2 in the database D and ignore all other observations in the database. De-
pending on the number of observations of draws from urn 2, say T(2), recorded in the database
D of length T, the decision maker may feel more or less conﬁdent about the accuracy of these
relative frequencies. Such ambiguity could be expressed by a neighborhood ε of the frequencies
(fD(2;B);fD(2;W)) of black and white balls drawn from urn 2 according to the records in the
database D. The neighborhood will depend on the number of relevant observations T(2), e.g.,
H (D | 2;a0) =
 
(hW;hB) ∈ ∆
1 | fD(2;W) −
ε
T(2)
≤ hW ≤ fD(2;W) +
ε
T(2)
 
.
The set of probabilities over outcomes H (D | 2;a0) may shrink with an increasing number of
relevant observations.
8The last example illustrates how information in a database may be used and how one can model
ambiguity about the probability distributions over outcomes. In this example, we assumed that
the decision maker ignores all observations which do not relate to urn 2 directly. If there is
little information about draws from urn 2, however, a decision maker may also want to consider
evidence from urn 1 and urn 3, possibly with weights reﬂecting the fact that these cases as less
relevant for a draw from urn 2
5. The representation derived in the next section allows for this
possibility.
4 Axioms and Representation
In this section, we will take the decision situation (x0;a0) as given. We will relate the frequen-
cies of cases in a database D,
fD (c) :=
|{ct ∈ D | ct = c}|
| D|
,
to sets of probabilities over outcomes H(D | x0;a0). In particular, let HT (D | x0;a0) be the
restriction of H(D | x0;a0) to databases of length T. We will impose axioms on the set of
probability distributions over outcomes H (D | x0;a0) which will imply a representation of the
following type: for each T ≥ 2 and each database of length T,
HT (D | x0;a0) =
  
c∈D s(c | x0;a0)fD (c) ˆ pT (c)
 
c∈D s(c | x0;a0)fD (c)
| ˆ pT (c) ∈ ˆ PT(c | x0;a0)
 
.
Theweighting function s(c | x0;a0) represents therelevanceofacasecforthecurrent situation
(x0;a0) and can be interpreted as the perceived similarity between c and (x0;a0). ˆ PT(c | x0;a0)
is a set of probability distributions over outcomes and represents the beliefs entertained by the
decision maker when the database D =
 
c...c     
T-times
 
is observed. The axioms suggested below
will imply (up to a normalization) unique similarity weights s(c | x0;a0), which do not depend
on T and, for each T ≥ 2, unique sets of probability distributions ˆ PT(c | x0;a0). This result
generalizes the main theorem of BGSS (2005) to the case of multiple priors.
In the following discussion, (x0;a0) is assumed constant and we suppress notational reference
5 Part III of KEYNES (1921) provides an extensive review of the literature on induction from cases
to probabilities.
9to it. It is important to keep in mind, however, that all statements of axioms and conclusions do
depend on the relevant reference situation (x0;a0). In particular, the similarity weights, deduced
below, measure similarity of cases relative to this reference situation.
In order to characterize the mapping H(D) we will impose axioms which specify how beliefs
over outcomes change in response to additional information. In general, it is possible that the
order in which data becomes available conveys important information. We will abstract here
from this possibility and assume that only the data matters for the probability distributions over
outcomes.
Axiom A1 (Invariance) Let π be a one-to-one mapping π : {1...T} → {1...T}, then
H
 
(ct)
T
t=1
 
= H
  
cπ(t)
 T
t=1
 
.
According to Axiom A1 the order of cases in a database D = (ct)
T
t=1 is irrelevant. The set
of probability distributions over outcomes is invariant with respect to the sequence in which
data arrives. Hence, each database D is uniquely characterized by the tuple (fD;|D|), where
fD ∈ ∆|C|−1 denotes the vector of frequencies of the cases c ∈ C in the data-set D and |D| the
length of the database.
In line with BGSS (2005), we call the combination of two databases a concatenation.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Concatenation) For any two databases D = (ct)
T
t=1 and D′ = (c′
t)
T′
t=1, the
database
D ◦ D
′ =
 
(ct)
T
t=1 ;(c
′
t)
T′
t=1
 
is called the concatenation of D and D′.
The following notational conventions are useful.
Notation By Axiom A1 a concatenation is a commutative operation on databases. Hence,
we will write Dk = D ◦ ... ◦ D       
k-times
for k concatenations of the same database D. In particular, a
database consisting of k-times the same case c can be written as (c)
k .
Imposing the following Concatenation Axiom, BGSS (2005) obtain a characterization of a
10function h mapping D into a single probability distribution over outcomes.
Axiom (BGSS 2005) (Concatenation) For every D, D′ ∈ D,
h(D ◦ D
′) = λh(D) + (1 − λ)h(D
′)
for some λ ∈ (0;1).
The Concatenation Axiom of BGSS (2005) implies that, for any k, the databases D and Dk
map into the same probability distribution over outcomes, h(D) = h(Dk). Hence, two data-sets
D = (c) and D′ = (c)
10000 will be regarded as equivalent. This seems counterintuitive.
Ten thousand observations of the same case c = (x;a;r) are likely to provide stronger evi-
dence for the outcome r in situation (x;a) than a single observation. Arguably, the database
(c)
10000 provides strong evidence for a probability distribution concentrated on the outcome
r; h((c)
10000) = er. Hence, er should be in the set of probability distributions H
 
(c)
10000 
associated with the database (c)
10000 . Based on a single observation (x;a;r), however, it ap-
pears quite reasonable to consider a set of probability distributions H((c)) which also contains
probability distributions h((c)) with hr′ ((c)) ∈ (0,1) for all r′. In particular, based on the in-
formation contained in D = (c), a decision maker may not be willing to exclude the case of
all outcomes being equally probable, i.e., h(D) with hr′(D) = 1
|R| for all r′ ∈ R. It appears
perfectly reasonable to include h in H ((c)) but not in H
 
(c)
10000 
.
Since we would like to capture the fact that conﬁdence might increase as the number of ob-
servations grows, we cannot simply apply the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS (2005) to all
probability distributions in the mapping H. Restricting the axiom to databases with equal length
will provide sufﬁcient ﬂexibility for our purpose.
Denote by DT := CT the set of databases of length T Recall that the convex combination of
two sets H and H′ is deﬁned by
λH + (1 − λ)H
′ = {λh + (1 − λ)h
′ | h ∈ H and h
′ ∈ H
′}.
Axiom A2 (Concatenation) Consider a data set F ∈ DT and, for some n ∈ Z+, let D1...Dn
∈ DT be such that D1 ◦ ... ◦ Dn = F n. Then, there exists a vector (λ1...λn−1) ∈ int(∆n−1)
11such that, for every k ∈ Z+,
n  
i=1
λiH
 
D
k
i
 
= H
 
F
k 
.
To illustrate the axiom, consider an example. Let T = 3, |C| = 3 and take
F =
 
f =
 
1
3
;
2
3
;0
 
;T = 3
 
.
Note that F 3 can be represented as concatenation of D1 = (c1)
3 and D2 = D3 = (c2)
3:
F
3 = D1 ◦ D2 ◦ D3 = D1 ◦ D
2
2.
Axiom A2 asserts the existence of λ1, λ2, λ3 ∈ (0;1) such that λ1 + λ2 + λ3 = 1 and:
λ1H (D1) + λ2H (D2) + λ3H (D3) = H (F).
Each data-set with at least two observations can be represented as a concatenation by choosing
n and the data-sets (Di)
n
i=1 in an appropriate way, e.g., by choosing the basis of the vector space
DT, with Di = (ci)
T and that the representation is in general non-unique.
In spirit, Axiom A2 is very similar to the Concatenation Axiom introduced by BGSS (2005).
The main difference is that we restrict the axiom to data sets of equal length. Restricted to the
set DT, Axiom A2 has the following implication: if the evidence of each of the n data-sets of
equal length D1...Dn suggests that a given outcome r is possible, i.e. for all i ∈ {1...n},
hr (Di) > 0 for some h ∈ H (Di)
then r must be considered possible under the data-set F, i.e.
hr (F) > 0 for some h ∈ H (F)
resulting from the concatenation of these data-sets, while controlling for the length of the data-
set.
The restriction to sets of equal length is important for our approach since databases of different
length may give rise to different degrees of conﬁdence. To see this, consider the databases D
and D2 = D ◦ D. Since the database D2 contains twice the number of cases in database D,
it appears reasonable to assume that the decision maker should be more conﬁdent to make a
prediction based on the bigger database D2 than on D. In other words, it might be that D does
12not contain enough observations to exclude the possibility of a given outcome r, i.e. h(r) > 0
for some h ∈ H (D), whereas the data-set D2 is sufﬁciently long to imply hr (D2) = 0 for all
h ∈ H (D2). Applying the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS (2005), we would conclude that
for some λ ∈ (0,1)
H
 
D
2 
= H (D ◦ D) = λH(D) + (1 − λ)H(D) = H (D),
which seems counterintuitive in this context. Thus, imposing BGSS (2005)’s Concatenation
Axiom, the set of probability distributions over outcomes would necessarily be independent
of the number of observations. Our weaker Axiom A2, however, implies in this case only
λH (D) + (1 − λ)H (D) = H (D), which is trivially satisﬁed for any set D.
Remark 4.1 Note that Axiom A2 requires the weights λ to be constant across different T’s,
as long as the frequencies of the data-sets entering the concatenation remain unchanged. This
assumption is crucial for our result that the similarity function is uniquely determined. In
particular, we can construct the similarity function for a speciﬁc class of data-sets contain-
ing inﬁnitely many observations by using the methods of BGSS (2005) and then, using this
assumption, extend the representation to all ﬁnite data-sets.
Similar to BGSS (2005), we have to impose a linear-independence condition on the sets prob-
ability distributions over outcomes H (D).
Axiom A3 (Linear Independence) For every T ∈ Z+, the basis of DT, (c1)
T,...,
 
c|C|
 T satis-
ﬁes the following condition:
There are at least three distinct i, j, k ∈ {1...|C|}, such that H
 
(ci)
T
 
, H
 
(cj)
T
 
and
H
 
(ck)
T
 
are:
– either singletons
H
 
(cm)
T
 
=
 
h
 
(cm)
T
  
for m ∈ {i;j;k}
and h
 
(ci)
T
 
, h
 
(cj)
T
 
and h
 
(ck)
T
 
are non-collinear,
– orpolyhedrawithanon-emptyinteriorsuchthatnothreeoftheirextremepointsarecollinear.
As an example of sets H (D) satisfying Axiom A3 consider the case of |C| = |R| = 3. In
13particular, take c1 = (x;a;r1), c2 = (x;a;r2) and c3 = (x;a;r3). Suppose that each of the
H
 
(ci)
T
 
represents a conﬁdence interval around the actually realized frequency of outcomes,
e1 = (1;0;0), e2 = (0;1;0) and e3 = (0;0;1). Then, these sets will satisfy the requirement of
Axiom A3, see Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Non-collinear sets of priors
The following theorem guarantees a unique similarity function for data sets of arbitrary length.
Theorem 4.1 LetH beacorrespondenceH : D → ∆|R|−1 theimages ofwhicharenon-empty
convex and compact sets and let HT (D) be the restriction of H to DT. Then the following two
statements are equivalent:
(i) H satisﬁes the Axioms Invariance (A1), Concatenation (A2), and Linear Independence
(A3) for every T ≥ 2.
(ii) There exists a function
s : C → R++
and, for each T ∈ Z+, T ≥ 2, there exists a correspondence
ˆ PT : C → ∆
|R|−1
satisfying Linear Independence and such that for any D ∈ DT
HT (D) =
  
c∈C s(c) ˆ pT (c)fD (c)
 
c∈C s(c)fD (c)
| ˆ pT (c) ∈ ˆ PT (c)
 
.
Moreover, for each T, ˆ PT is unique and s is unique up to a multiplication by a positive number.
Note how the different axioms enter this representation. (A1) insures that the only relevant
14characteristics of a data-set D are the generated frequencies (fD (c))c∈C and its length T. We
then use (A2) and (A3) to show that for a class of databases with inﬁnite length, we can rep-
resent H (D) as a union of functions h(D) which satisfy the axioms of BGSS (2005). This
class of data-sets can be characterized by its frequencies, which are dense in the simplex of di-
mension |C|−1. Hence, we can apply Proposition 3 of BGSS (2005) to every selection h(D)
in order to demonstrate the existence of a unique (up to a multiplication by a positive constant)
similarity function s and unique probabilities ˆ p. Axiom (A2) then implies that the same values
of s can be used for every T < ∞.
5 Discussion of the Main Result
We will use Example 3.1 to illustrate the representation derived in Theorem 4.1 and to discuss
the notion of similarity.
5.1 Leading Example
Example 3.1 resumed
Consider a doctor who has to choose one of two treatments, a ∈ A = {a1;a2}. In past treat-
ments, one has recorded only two characteristics of patients, high blood pressure, xh, or low
bloodpressure, xl. Hence, thesetofpotentially case-relevantdatacomprises x ∈ X = {xh;xl}.
Finally, three outcomes of the treatment have been registered, say r1, success, r2, no effect, and
r3, failure, i.e., R = {r1;r2;r3}.
In this situation, databases D of any length T will be made up of the following twelve cases:
C =

          
          
c1 = (x1;a1;r1)
c2 = (x1;a1;r2)
c3 = (x1;a1;r3)
c4 = (x1;a2;r1)
c5 = (x1;a2;r2)
c6 = (x1;a2;r3)
c7 = (x2;a1;r1)
c8 = (x2;a1;r2)
c9 = (x2;a1;r3)
c10 = (x2;a2;r1)
c11 = (x2;a2;r2)
c12 = (x2;a2;r3)

          
          
For each T and each case ci, i = 1...12, consider the following sets of probabilities over out-
15comes:
ˆ PT(ci) := {ˆ p ∈ ∆2| ˆ p1 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i = 1;4;7;10,
ˆ PT(ci) := {ˆ p ∈ ∆2 | ˆ p2 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i = 2;5;8;11,
ˆ PT(ci) := {ˆ p ∈ ∆2 | ˆ p3 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i = 3;6;9;12
for some ε > 0.
This assignment of probabilities over outcomes can be given the following interpretation. Data-
bases with constant (x;a) provide a controlled experiment about the probabilities over out-
comes, e.g., a database made up only of cases c1, c2 and c3 would generate a frequency on R
which might serve as an estimate for the probabilities on R. If there is some ambiguity ε about
this estimate, which appears natural if there are few observations, one may assume that this
ambiguity decreases as the number of conﬁrming observations T grows. In particular, data-
bases containing only a single case (x;a;r) may have the probability distribution yielding the
outcome r with probability 1 as a natural ﬁrst estimate. Note also that the ˆ PT(ci) satisfy Linear
independence (Axiom A3).
We will assume ﬁxed similarity weights (s1;...;s12) for the twelve basic cases. For an arbitrary
database D of length T with frequencies of cases fD one obtains the following set HT(D) of
probability distributions:
HT(D) : =



h ∈ ∆
2 | h =
 
12  
i=1
s(ci)fD(ci)
 −1  
12  
i=1
s(ci)fD(ci)ˆ pT (ci)
 
,
ˆ pT (ci) ∈ ˆ PT(ci), i ∈ {1;...;12}
 
.
5.2 Similarity
The similarity weights s(ci) of Theorem 4.1 have to be seen in relation to the decision situation
(x0;a0) under consideration. The notation s(c | x0;a0) emphasizes this relationship. If a de-
cision situation (x0;a0) is part of the cases considered in C, then there are cases (x0;a0;r) in
C which are distinguished only by the outcomes. In this case, it appears natural to assign the
highest degree of similarity to these cases.
There are decision situations which are completely speciﬁed in the sense that all relevant as-
pects of the situation are included in the data x collected, as in Example 3.3. In such cases,
one may be willing to assign similarity weights of zero to all cases with different data. This
16appears to be an extreme case, which may obtain in experimental situations in statistics and
physics. However, even in those applications, an insufﬁcient number of relevant observations
may necessitate considering data from similar, but not exactly identical situations. Such cases
would naturally receive lower similarity weights s(c | x0;a0).
In general, however, the decision maker will be uncertain about which data is important for the
outcome. Such cases are described in Examples 3.1 and 3.2. In these cases, it would also be
reasonable to consider cases in C which do not exactly match the decision situation (x0;a0), but
may be relevant given the lack of information about the data which determines the outcomes.
In Example 3.2, there is data about a customer’s choice of movie from a set of categories and
languages. If the decision problem is to make a recommendation to a customer, it may be
reasonable to give some weight to movies from the category and language which the customer
has chosen in the past, but one may also want to consider other cases where customers with
similar characteristics x bought movies from similar categories.
The following example will illustrate such a procedure for a variation of Example 3.1.
Example 3.1 resumed
Consider a medical doctor who has to choose one of two treatments, a ∈ A = {a1;a2}. In
past treatments one has recorded only three characteristics of patients, high blood pressure, xh,
normal blood pressure, xm, or low blood pressure, xl. Hence, the set of potentially case-relevant
data comprises also x ∈ X = {xh;xm;xl}. Finally, three outcomes of the treatment have been
registered, say r1, success, r2, no effect, and r3, failure, i.e., R = {r1;r2;r3}.
In this case, databases D of any length T will be made up of the following eighteen cases:
C =

          
          
c1 = (xl;a1;r1)
c2 = (xl;a1;r2)
c3 = (xl;a1;r3)
c4 = (xl;a2;r1)
c5 = (xl;a2;r2)
c6 = (xl;a2;r3)
c7 = (xm;a1;r1)
c8 = (xm;a1;r2)
c9 = (xm;a1;r3)
c10 = (xm;a2;r1)
c11 = (xm;a2;r2)
c12 = (xm;a2;r3)
c13 = (xh;a1;r1)
c14 = (xh;a1;r2)
c15 = (xh;a1;r3)
c16 = (xh;a2;r1)
c17 = (xh;a2;r2)
c18 = (xh;a2;r3)

          
          
As in Example 3.1 and with a similar interpretation in mind, we can construct the sets of prob-
17ability distributions ˆ PT(ci):
ˆ PT(ci) := {ˆ p ∈ ∆2 | ˆ p1 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i = 1;4;7;10;13;16
ˆ PT(ci) := {ˆ p ∈ ∆2 | ˆ p2 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i = 2;5;8;11;14;17
ˆ PT(ci) := {ˆ p ∈ ∆2 | ˆ p3 ≥ (1 − ε
T)} for i = 3;6;9;12;15;18
for some ε > 0.
Assuming ﬁxed similarity weights (s1;...;s18) for the eighteen basic cases, we arrive at the
representation:
HT(D) : = {h ∈ ∆
2 | h =
 
18  
i=1
s(ci)fD(ci)
 −1  
18  
i=1
s(ci)fD(ci)ˆ p(ci)
 
, ˆ p(ci) ∈ ˆ PT(ci),
i = 1;...;18}.
Figure 2 illustrates this procedure. Disregarding ambiguity for the sake of the argument, let us
assume for a moment that ˆ PT(c = (xi;aj;rk)) = {ek} for all c ∈ C, where ek denotes the kth
unit vector in the space of outcomes R3.
Suppose that the problem under consideration is characterized by (xh;a2). Then it appears
natural to assign a similarity weight of one to the cases {c16;c17;c18} which are identical and
differentiated only by the outcome. If one were to adhere strictly to the same type of cases, then
one may want to put all other similarity weights to zero, leaving us with the relative frequencies
of the outcomes observed for case (xh;a2) in the sample D as the predicted probability over
outcomes: 

p1
p2
p3

 = (fD(c16) + fD(c17) + fD(c18))
−1


fD(c16)
fD(c17)
fD(c18)

.
For large data-sets D with many observations of cases c16;c17;c18 this may be a reasonable
procedure. It may well be, however, that D contains few or no observations of cases with high
blood pressure, in which treatment a2 has been prescribed. Then one may reasonably take into
account cases which are not identical but arguably relevant. E.g., one could presume that a
patient with normal blood pressure is more similar to a patient with high blood pressure than a
patient with low blood pressure. Hence, the similarity of cases with normal blood pressure may
be smaller than the similarity of cases with high blood pressure, but higher than the similarity
of cases with low blood pressure, say one half. Assuming further that cases in which x = xl are
18deemed irrelevant for this prediction yields:


p1
p2
p3

 =
 
1
2
fD(c10) +
1
2
fD(c11) +
1
2
fD(c12) + fD(c16) + fD(c17) + fD(c18)
 −1
 
 


fD(c16) + 1
2fD(c10)
fD(c17) + 1
2fD(c11)
fD(c18) + 1
2fD(c12)

.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
ˆ PT (ei), i = 1, 4, 7, 10
ˆ PT (ei), i = 2, 5, 8, 11 ˆ PT (ei), i = 3, 6, 9, 12
H(fD, T)
p(r1) = 1
p(r2) = 1 p(r3) = 1
Figure 2. Constructing hypotheses using similarity weights
6 Learnability and conﬁdence
The main focus of this paper is ambiguity in the context of case-based predictions of probabili-
ties over outcomes. If a decision maker has to consider cases of different degrees of similarity
then it appears natural to assume that a decision maker feels ambiguous about the predicted
probability distribution over outcomes. There are several ways to model ambiguity, among
them the multiple prior approach introduced by GILBOA & SCHMEIDLER (1989). In the spirit
of this paper, we model ambiguity by a set of probability distributions over outcomes. The
degree of ambiguity will be measured by set inclusion. The smaller the set of probability distri-
butions over outcomes, the less ambiguous the prediction.
Notice that in Example 3.1, the sets ˆ PT(c) shrink to a singleton if T tends to inﬁnity, e.g.,
lim
T→∞
ˆ PT(xi;aj;rk) = {ek}
for all xi ∈ X, aj ∈ A, rk ∈ R. Moreover, ˆ PT(ci) ⊂ ˆ PT−1(ci) for all i.These assumptions
19seem quite natural in the context of controlled experiments. The ﬁrst one says that ambiguity
decreases with "more information" in the sense of "more cases with the same outcome". The
second one implies that as the same outcome is observed over and over again, its perceived
probability converges to 1. In the following, we provide axioms which capture this intuition
and analyze their implication for the perception of similarity.
We focus on a decision maker who tries to learn the properties of statistical experiments as
those described in Example 3.3. In particular, we keep the characteristics of the situation as
well as the action constant and model learning about the probability distribution of outcomes
in R. Learning a probability distribution is meaningful only if we assume stationarity and
ergodicity of the underlying random process according to which the outcome is generated. The
learning process of the decision maker consists in formulating a set of probability distributions
over outcomes, describing the likelihood of outcome r given a combination of an observed
signal x and an action a. In the trivial case of a repeated experiment, i.e. (x;a) is constant,
the set of probability distributions over outcomes is assumed to contain the actually observed
frequencies. The size of the set of probability distributions over outcomes can be taken to
reﬂect the conﬁdence of the decision maker with respect to the data. Given our assumption
of ergodicity, as the data set becomes larger, the conﬁdence of the decision maker increases
until (with an inﬁnite number of observations), the set of probability distributions reduces to
a singleton. Moreover, if the assumption of ergodicity is satisﬁed and D = ((x;a;rt))
∞
t=1,
then, according to the Ergodic Theorem, DURETT (2005, P. 337), the frequencies of r a.s.
converge to a probability distribution f (r)which exactly corresponds to the actual probability
distribution of r given (x;a):
lim
T→∞
|{t ≤ T | rt = r}|
T
= lim
T→∞
fT (r) = f (r).
This motivates the following axioms which speciﬁes the rules by which the decision maker
forms hypotheses.
Axiom A4 (Learnability) Consider databases with ﬁxed (x;a),
D =
 
(x;a;rt)
T
t=1
 
.
20As T → ∞,
H (D | x;a) → {h(D | x;a)}
with
hr (D | x;a) = fD (r).
According to Axiom A4, the decision maker can learn the unknown proportion of the colors in
a given urn, as in Example 3.3, if the draws from the urn are with replacement, and the number
of observations becomes large.
Finally, we will assume that a decision maker’s conﬁdence in the observed frequencies of cases
grows with a growing number of observations.
Axiom A5 (Accumulation of knowledge) Let D =
 
(x;a;rt)
T
t=1
 
and D′ =
 
(x;a;r′
t)
T′
t=1
 
be two ﬁnite data-sets such that fD = fD′ and T ′ > T, then
H (D
′ | x;a) ⊂ H(D | x;a).
Axiom A5 captures the idea that the ambiguity of the decision maker about the true probability
distribution of r decreases as the number of observations increases in a controlled experiment,
i.e., for ﬁxed (x;a). Notice that Axiom A5 applies only to data-sets in which frequencies are
identical. If frequencies differ, a smaller set might be more reliable than a larger one. For
example, D ∈ D100 with fD (x;a;r1) = 99
100 and fD (x;a;r2) = 1
100 will in general constitute
stronger support for h(r1 | x;a) = 99
100 than D′ ∈ D200 with fD′ (x;a;r1) = fD′ (x;a;r2) = 1
2.
Axiom A5 however does not tell us in which way the set of probabilities over outcomes shrinks.
TogetherwiththeInvarianceAxiom(A1), AxiomsA4 andA5implythattheobservedfrequency
of outcomes in a controlled experiment is always contained in the set of probabilities over
outcomes which the decision maker considers.
Lemma 6.1 Assume Axioms A1, A4 and A5 hold, then for any database D of length T with
ﬁxed (x;a), i.e., D = ((x;a;rt)
T
t=1), there is an h ∈ H (D | x;a) such that
hr (D | x;a) = fD (r)
for all r ∈ R.
21Finally, we prove that together with the representation derived in Theorem 4.1, Axioms A4 and
A5 imply two intuitive properties of the representation of H(D). Firstly, the sets ˆ PT (x;a;r)
shrink with time, always contain the r-th unit vector er and converge to er as T converges to
inﬁnity. Secondly, for a given tuple (x;a), the similarity function assigns a value of 1 (up to
a normalization) to all cases (x;a;r′) with r′ ∈ R. Hence, as long as the conditions under
which the experiment is conducted remain constant, all outcomes of the experiment are equally
relevant for the assessment of probabilities.
Theorem 6.2 Suppose Axioms A4 and A5 hold. Then the representation H(D | x;a) in
Theorem 4.1 satisﬁes the additional properties:
1. For all r ∈ R and all T,
(i) ˆ PT ((x;a;r) | x;a) ⊂ ˆ PT−1 ((x;a;r) | x;a),
(ii)er ∈ ˆ PT ((x;a;r) | x;a), and
(iii) lim
T→∞
ˆ PT ((x;a;r) | x;a) = {er}.
2. For all r ∈ R, . s((x;a;r);(x;a)) = 1.
7 Concluding remarks
The amount of data available may inﬂuence a decision maker’s conﬁdence in a probability
distribution. In this paper we combine this intuition with the similarity-weighted frequency
approach of BGSS (2005). We relax the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS (2005) by restricting
it to data-bases of equal length. We show that the main result of BGSS (2005), namely that the
similarity function is unique remains true if one imposes consistency on the weights across data
sets of different size. This consistency is essential for the uniqueness of the similarity weights.
As aspecialcaseofourapproach weconsiderpredictionsassociatedwith homogenousdata-sets
which contain the same characteristics and actions in all observations. Homogenous data-sets
canarisefromcontrolledstatisticalexperiments. Inthiscontextitappearsnaturalthatambiguity
decreases as new data conﬁrms past evidence. Combined with the assumption that, in the limit,
22the decision maker learns the probability distribution generating the process, one obtains the
conclusion that all observations are considered equally important. Statistical experiments can
serve as an illustration of our approach. Similarity becomes important however, when data sets
contain only few cases.
In this paper, we derive a representation in which the similarity weights are independent of the
amount of data. If one views the perception of similarity, however, as an imperfect substitute for
knowledge about the relevance of underlying data, then a decision maker has to ﬁnd out which
characteristics are payoff-relevant. Hence, the data-set may provide not only information about
the distribution of payoffs, but also about similarity of alternatives. The more observations a
data-set contains, the more precise the perception of similarity may become.
This observation raises several questions for further research. On the one hand, one may try to
model the adjustment of the similarity function in the light of new information. PESKI (2007)
suggests a possible approach. Hedescribes alearning process, in which thedecision-maker tries
to assign objects optimally to categories in order to make correct predictions. Two objects do
either belong to a category or do not belong to it. One can interpret this approach as a restriction
of the similarity values to zero or one. A less restrictive model would allows for a continuum
of similarity values.
A second research agenda concerns the derivation of a decision rule and a multiple-prior rep-
resentation of beliefs from preferences over actions and data sets. Combining axioms from
case-based decision making and from the literature on decision making under ambiguity, it ap-
pears possible to ﬁnd a representation of preferences over acts and a set of probabilities over
outcomes depending on the data set.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4.1 :
It is obvious that the representation satisﬁes the axioms, hence we prove only the sufﬁciency of
the axioms for the representation.
23Denote by Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 the set of rational probability vectors of dimension |C|. We use of
Proposition 3 from BGSS (2005, P. 1132), which we state in terms of our notation:
Proposition A.1 BGSS (2005) Assume that h : Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 → ∆|R|−1 satisﬁes the condi-
tions:
(i) for every f, f′ ∈ Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 and every rational α ∈ (0;1),
h(αf + (1 − α)f
′) = λh(f) + (1 − λ)h(f
′),
for some λ ∈ (0;1) and
(ii′) not all {h(f)}f∈Q
|C|
+ ∩∆|C|−1 are collinear.
Then there are probability vectors (ˆ p(c))c∈C ∈ ∆|R|−1 not all of which are collinear and posi-
tive numbers (s(c))c∈C such that for every f ∈ Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1,
h(f) =
 
c∈C s(c)f (c) ˆ p(c)
 
c∈C s(c)f (c)
.
The idea of the proof is as follows. First, we construct a sequence of sets consisting of ﬁnite
data-bases in such a way that the limit of this sequence is a set of inﬁnite data-bases D∞.
Moreover, we show that, for each vector f in the set Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1, D∞ contains a data-set,
which has f as its frequency, see Lemma A.2. Hence, we can think of H as a mapping from
Q
|C|
+ ∩∆|C|−1 to ∆|R|−1. In a second step (Lemmas A.3, A.4 and Corollary A.5), using Axioms
(A2) and (A3), we show that H can be represented as a union of functions h, all of which
satisfy properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition A.1 when restricted to D∞. Next, in Lemma A.6,
we apply the construction used in the proof of Proposition 3 in BGSS (2005) to determine the
similarity function s for the restriction of each h to D∞. It is straightforward to show that the
similarity weights do not depend on h. The last step, Lemma A.7, consists in using Axiom (A2)
to show that the same similarity weights can be used for data-sets of any length T ≥ 2.
We denote the possible frequency vectors which can be generated by a data-set of length T by:
QT =
 
f ∈ ∆
|C|−1 | f (c) =
k
T
for some k ∈ {0;1...T} and for all c ∈ C
 
.
Obviously, for each T, QT ⊂ Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1. Our ﬁrst Lemma shows that we can approximate
Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 by QT by choosing a speciﬁc sequence of T’s. We denote by lim (lim), the
inferior (superior) limit of a sequence of sets, (see BERGE (1963, P. 118) for deﬁnitions and
24properties).
Lemma A.2 Consider the inﬁnite sequence T1;T2...Tm... with Tm = m!.
lim
m→∞
QTm = Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆
|C|−1.
We will denote by D∞ the set of data-bases which give rise to the set Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1.
Proof of Lemma A.2:
First, we show
limm→∞QTm = Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆
|C|−1
Hence, we check that for each q ∈ Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1, there exists an M ∈ Z+ such that for all
m ≥ M, q ∈ QTm. To see this, write q as a vector of ratios
q =
 
ai
bi
 |C|
i=1
,
with ai and bi ∈ Z+, and take the largest of the numbers bi, b(q) = maxi∈{1...|C|} bi. Now set
M = b(q) and observe that for all m ≥ M, each ratio
ai
bi can be written as:
ai
bi
=
aiki
b(q)!(b(q) + 1)(b(q) + 2)...m
=
aiki
bi (bi − 1)!(bi + 1)(bi + 2)...m
=
aiki
Tm
with
ki = (bi − 1)!(bi + 1)(bi + 2)...m.
Since ai ≤ bi, it follows that
0 ≤ aiki ≤ Tm
and obviously aiki ∈ Z+. which proves the claim.
Second, we show that:
limm→∞QTm = Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆
|C|−1.
This follows immediately from the fact that QTm ⊂ Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 for all m ∈ Z+. Hence,
limm→∞QTm = limm→∞QTm = lim
m→∞QTm = Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆
|C|−1. ￿
The next lemma A.3 allows us to relate the Concatenation Axiom, (A2) (which is formulated in
terms of data-sets) to property (i) in Proposition A.1 (stated in terms of frequencies).
25Lemma A.3 Let T ∈ Z+, f′, f′′, f ∈ QT and suppose that there is an α ∈ (0;1) such that:
αf
′ + (1 − α)f
′′ = f.
Denote by D = (f;T), D′ = (f′;T), D′′ = (f′′;T) the data-sets with length T and frequencies
f, f′ and f′′. Then, there exists a λ ∈ (0;1) such that:
λH (D
′) + (1 − λ)H (D
′′) = H (D).
Proof of Lemma A.3:
Construct the following set of data-bases D1 = ... = Dm−1 = Dm = D′;Dm+1 = ... = Dn =
D′′ with
m
n
= α.
Note that such integers m and n can be found as long as α is rational, which is satisﬁed since
f, f′ and f′′ ∈ QT. Now note that:
D1 ◦ ... ◦ Dm = (D
′)
m
Dm+1 ◦ ... ◦ Dn = (D
′′)
n−m
D1 ◦ ... ◦ Dn = (D)
n ,
and, hence, by (A2), there exists a vector   ∈ int(∆n−1) such that:
n  
i=1
 iH (Di) = H (D).
Hence,
H (D
′)
m  
i=1
 i + H (D
′′)
n  
i=m+1
 i = H (D).
Setting λ =
 m
i=1  i ∈ (0;1) concludes the proof.￿
For any T ≥ 2, let HT denote the restriction of H to DT. We now state a lemma which shows
that for every such T, we can express
HT : DT → ∆
|R|−1
as a collection of single hypotheses (functions)
hT : DT → ∆
|R|−1,
hT ∈ HT
which satisfy properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition A.1.
26Lemma A.4 Suppose that HT satisﬁes (A2) and (A3). Then, for each T ≥ 2, there is a set of
functions
HT=
 
hT : DT → ∆
|R|−1 
such that for each T ≥ 2,
∪hT∈HThT (D) = HT (D)
and the following properties are satisﬁed:
(i
′) whenever
λHT (D) + (1 − λ)HT (D
′) = HT
 
˜ D
 
,
for each hT ∈ HT,
λhT (D) + (1 − λ)hT (D
′) = hT
 
˜ D
 
and
(ii′) not all vectors
{hT (D)}D∈DT
are collinear.
Before stating the proof of Lemma A.4, we illustrate its implications by the following corollary:
Corollary A.5 Each hT ∈ HT as constructed in Lemma A.4 satisﬁes properties (i) and (ii)
stated in Proposition A.1, where the set Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 is replaced by QT for T < ∞.
Proof of Corollary A.5:
For a given T, each set D ∈ DT is uniquely identiﬁed by its frequency. Hence, property (ii′)
corresponds exactly to property (ii) from Proposition A.1. To see the relation between (i′) and
(i) recall that Lemma A.3 demonstrates that for every T ≥ 2, every D, D′, ˜ D ∈ DT with
frequencies f, f′, ˜ f ∈ QT (with Q∞ = Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1) and every rational α ∈ (0;1), such that
αf + (1 − α)f
′ = ˜ f,
HT
 
˜ D
 
= λHT (D) + (1 − λ)HT (D
′),
for some λ ∈ (0;1), whereas condition (i′) assures that for each hT ∈ HT,
hT
 
˜ D
 
= λhT (D) + (1 − λ)hT (D
′).
We can now write hT in terms of frequencies, thus obtaining the expression stated in (i):
hT
 
˜ f
 
= hT (αf + (1 − α)f) = λhT (f) + (1 − λ)hT (f
′).
Especially, for D∞, this expression is valid for any two f and f′ ∈ Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1 and every
27rational α ∈ (0;1).
Proof of Lemma A.4:
First, we show that hT satisfying property (i′) exist. By the Caratheodory Theorem, see GREEN
AND HELLER (1981, P. 40), we know that for a convex set HT (D) in a ﬁnite dimensional
space (such as R|R|−1), each point of the set can be represented as a convex combination of at
most |R| points in R|R|−1. Since we have assumed that HT
 
(ci)
T
 
are convex sets (polyhedra),
we can represent each such set as:
HT
 
(ci)
T
 
=



|R|  
j=1
αij ij |
|R|  
j=1
αij = 1 and αij ≥ 0



,
where
 
 ij
 |R|
j=1 istheabovementionedcollection ofpoints in R|R|−1. Notethat since
 
(ci)
T
 |C|
i=1
is a basis of DT, it follows that any linear combination of data-sets (written as (fD;|D| = T))
can be expressed as a linearcombination of (c1)
T ...
 
c|C|
 T. By Lemma A.3, for every D ∈ DT,
HT (D) =
|C|  
i=1
λiHT
 
(ci)
T
 
with
 |C|
i=1 λi = 1, λi ∈ (0;1), whenever ci occurs in D at least once and λi = 0, else. The
Caratheodory Theorem now allows us to write any such convex combination as:
HT (D) =
|C|  
i=1
λi



|R|  
j=1
αij ij |
|R|  
j=1
αij = 1 and αij ≥ 0



=
=



|C|  
i=1
λi
|R|  
j=1
αij ij |
|R|  
j=1
αij = 1 and αij ≥ 0



Hence, for ﬁxed collection of points
 
 ij
 |C| |R|
i=1j=1, we can identify each selection hT with a
vector of coefﬁcients (αij)
|C| |R|
i=1j=1. Property (i′) will be satisﬁed if we take the maximal set of
such selections, i.e.
∆
|C|×(|R|−1).
We will now consider only functions hT satisfying property (i′) and show that it is possible
to construct the set HT without violating property (ii′). In terms of the representation above,
property (ii′) can be reformulated as follows. Suppose that for some hT ∈ HT (as characterized
28by (αij)
|C| |R|
i=1j=1), the vectors:
(hT (D))D∈DT =


|R|  
j=1
αij ij


|C|
i=1
are collinear. The claim is that in the set of selections as given by ∆|C|×(|R|−1), we can ﬁnd
a set of different selections,
 
hD
T
 
D∈DT, such that for each ˆ D ∈ DT, h
ˆ D
T assumes the same
values as hT for ˆ D, but is obtained by a set of vectors
 
h
ˆ D
T (D)
 
D∈DT
at last three of which are
non-collinear.
Suppose ﬁrst that HT satisﬁes the condition of (A3) for some (ci)
T, (cj)
T and (ck)
T, all of
which are single points:
H (Dm) =
 
h
 
(cm)
T
  
for m ∈ {i;j;k}. Then, for each ˆ hT (  x;  a) ∈ HT (  x;  a),
ˆ hT
 
(ci)
T
 
= h
 
(ci)
T
 
ˆ hT
 
(cj)
T
 
= h
 
(cj)
T
 
ˆ hT
 
(ck)
T
 
= h
 
(ck)
T
 
must hold. Since these three vectors are not collinear by assumption, the result of the lemma
obtains for this case.
Suppose, therefore that HT satisﬁes the condition of (A3) for some i, j and k, such that all of
HT
 
(cm)
T
 
for m ∈ {i;j;k} have a non-empty interior. Take some set
ˆ D ∈ DT\
 
(c1)
T ...
 
c|C|
 T 
.
For each hypothesis hT
 
ˆ D
 
∈ HT
 
ˆ D
 
, we have:
hT
 
ˆ D
 
=
|C|  
m=1
λmhT
 
(cm)
T
 
for some hT
 
(cm)
T
 
∈ HT
 
(cm)
T
 
. Whenever hT
 
(ci)
T
 
, hT
 
(cj)
T
 
and hT
 
(ck)
T
 
entering this representation are non-collinear for any such hT
 
ˆ D
 
, the result of the lemma
obtains. Suppose, however that hT
 
(ci)
T
 
, hT
 
(cj)
T
 
and hT
 
(ck)
T
 
entering the represen-
29tation are all collinear. If for each m ∈ {i;j;k},
hT
 
(cm)
T
 
∈ int
 
HT
 
(cm)
T
  
then it is always possible to ﬁnd ǫi and ǫj ∈ ∆|R| which are not-collinear to hT
 
(cm)
T
 
for
m ∈ {i;j;k} such that
hT
 
ˆ D
 
= λi
 
hT
 
(ci)
T
 
+ ǫi
 
+ λj
 
hT
 
(cj)
T
 
+ ǫj
 
+
|C|  
m=1
m =i;j
λmhT
 
(cm)
T
 
, (A-1)
and
λiǫi + λjǫj = 0.
Now suppose that hT
 
(cm)
T
 
is an extreme point of
 
HT
 
(cm)
T
  
for every m ∈ {i;j;k}.
Then, Axiom (A3) insures that not all of these points are collinear and, hence, the result of the
lemma obtains.
The last case to consider is the one in which hT
 
(cm)
T
 
∈ bd
 
HT
 
(cm)
T
  
, but are not
extreme points for all m ∈ {i;j;k}. Suppose ﬁrst that the hyperplanes containing the sides
of the polyhedra on which hT
 
(ci)
T
 
and hT
 
(cj)
T
 
lie are not parallel. In that case, it is
obvious that there exist ǫi such that
hT
 
(ci)
T
 
+ ǫi ∈ int
 
HT
 
(ci)
T
  
and ǫj such that
hT
 
(cj)
T
 
+ ǫj ∈ bd
 
HT
 
(cj)
T
  
so that:
λiǫi + λjǫj = 0
and, hence, the equality in A-1 obtains. (This can be done, e.g. by choosing ǫj to lie in the
same hyperplane as hT
 
(cj)
T
 
and choosing
 
ǫi;hT
 
(ci)
T
  
to be parallel to the hyperplane
on which hT
 
(cj)
T
 
lies. An ǫi in the interior of HT
 
(cj)
T
 
exists by the assumption that the
two hyperplanes are not parallel).
Suppose now that all three of the hyperplanes containing the sides of the polyhedra on which
hT
 
(cm)
T
 
lie are parallel, but at least two of them are distinct. Then choose vectors ǫi and ǫj
30such that
λiǫi + λjǫj = 0
and both ǫi and ǫj are parallel to the hyperplanes containing the sides of the polyhedra on which
hT
 
(cm)
T
 
lie. It is obvious that ǫi and ǫj can always be chosen in such a way that
hT
 
(ci)
T
 
+ ǫi, hT
 
(cj)
T
 
+ ǫj and hT
 
(ck)
T
 
are not collinear.
If the three hyperplanes coincide, there are two possibilities: either at least one of the points
belongs to the interior of a face on this hyperplane or all of the points lie on edges of the poly-
hedra. Let hT
 
(ci)
T
 
belong to the interior of a face. If the edge containing, say hT
 
(cj)
T
 
is
not collinear to the edge containing hT
 
(ck)
T
 
, then, it is obviously possible to ﬁnd ǫi and ǫj
satisfying the necessary condition A-1. The idea is to move hT
 
(cj)
T
 
by ǫj along the edge to
which it belongs, while moving theinterior point hT
 
(ci)
T
 
in the opposite direction by theuse
of ǫi. If both edges are collinear, then ǫj can be chosen in such a way so as to move hT
 
(cj)
T
 
into the interior of HT
 
(cj)
T
 
, whereas again it is always possible to move the interior point
hT
 
(ci)
T
 
into the exactly opposite direction by means of ǫj.
If at least two of the edges are not parallel, then the existence of ǫi and ǫj is obvious, as in the
case of non-parallel hyperplanes. If the edges are parallel but distinct lines in this hyperplane,
proceed as in the case of three parallel but distinct hyperplanes. If all of the lines containing the
edges coincide, then all vertices contained in these edges must be collinear, which is excluded
by (A3).￿
Lemma A.6 Let D ∈ D∞. Then,
H∞ (D) =
  
c∈C s(c) ˆ p∞(c)fD (c)
 
c∈C s(c)fD (c)
| ˆ p∞(c) ∈ ˆ P∞(c)
 
,
where
ˆ P∞(c) = H ((c)
∞),
(and hence, satisfy Linear Independence) and s(c) are given by the unique (up to a multipli-
cation by a positive number) solution of the equation:
 |C|
i=1
1
|C|s(ci) ˆ p∞(ci)
 |C|
i=1
1
|C|s(ci)
=
|C|  
i=1
λih((ci)
∞).
31Proof of Lemma A.6:
Obviously, the construction in Lemma A.4 does not depend on T. Hence, for the sequence Tm
as deﬁned in Lemma A.2, letting m → ∞, we can represent H∞ as a selection of functions
h∞ which satisfy all of the conditions of Proposition A.1. We can, therefore, apply directly the
result of the proposition and state, for each h∞, the existence of unique vectors
ˆ p∞(c1)...ˆ p∞
 
c|C|
 
such that
h∞ ((ci)
∞) =
 
c∈C s(c) ˆ p∞(c)f(ci)
∞ (c)
 
c∈C s(c)f(ci)∞ (c)
= ˆ p∞ (ci),
or
ˆ p∞(c1) = h((c1)
∞)...ˆ p∞
 
c|C|
 
= h
 
c|C|
 ∞.
Taking the union of all such vectors ˆ p, we thus obtain the sets
ˆ P∞ (ci) = ∪h∞∈H∞h∞ (ci)
∞ = H∞((ci)
∞) for i ∈ {1...|C|}.
These sets trivially satisfy the conditions of Axiom (A3). We can now determine the similarity
function for each of the vectors
ˆ p
1
∞(c1)...ˆ p∞
 
c|C|
 
separately by solving:
 |C|
i=1
1
|C|s(ci) ˆ p∞(ci)
 |C|
i=1
1
|C|s(ci)
=
|C|  
i=1
λih∞((ci)
∞). (A-2)
For the case |C| = 3, the condition that h((c1)
∞), h((c2)
∞) and h((c3)
∞) are non-collinear
implies that this system has a unique solution, {s∞ ((ci))}
3
i=1. For the case of |C| > 3, we
can apply Step 2 of the proof of BGSS (2005), which implies that no matter which three
non-collinear vectors are chosen, the resulting similarity functions differ only with respect to a
multiplication by a positive number. Lemma A.4 insures that (λi)
|C|
i=1 remain the same for all
functions h. Since ˆ p∞ (ci) = h∞ ((ci)
∞) it follows that the unique (up to a multiplication by
a positive number) solution to this equation does not depend on the chosen vector and is given
by:
s(ci) = λi. ￿
32Lemma A.7 For every T ≥ 2 and D ∈ DT,
HT (D) =
  
c∈C s(c) ˆ pT (c)fD (c)
 
c∈C s(c)fD (c)
| ˆ pT (c) ∈ ˆ PT (c)
 
,
where
ˆ PT (c) = H
 
(c)
T
 
,
and s(c) are the unique (up to a multiplication by a positive number) solution of equation A-2.
Proof of Lemma A.7:
First note that using the argument in the proof of Proposition 3 in BGSS (2005, P. 1134) we
can show that the solution of the system:
T−1
T s(c1) ˆ p∞(c1) + 1
Ts(c2) ˆ p∞(c2)
T−1
T s(c1) + 1
Ts(c2)
(A-3)
= λ
1h∞((c1)
∞) +
 
1 − λ
1 
h∞ ((c2)
∞)
...
T−1
T s
 
c|C|−1
 
ˆ p∞
 
c|C|−1
 
+ 1
Ts
 
c|C|
 
ˆ p∞
 
c|C|
 
T−1
T s
 
c|C|−1
 
+ 1
Ts
 
c|C|
 
= λ
|C|−1h∞
  
c|C|−1
 ∞ 
+
 
1 − λ
|C|−1
1
 
h∞
  
c|C|
 ∞ 
is identical (up to a multiplication by a positive number) to the solution of equation A-2. Note
that this argument uses only properties (i) and (ii), but does not make use of the fact that h∞ is
deﬁned on the set Q
|C|
+ ∩ ∆|C|−1.
Let T < ∞. Corollary A.5 shows that properties (i) and (ii) stated in Proposition A.1 are
satisﬁed for all ﬁnite data-sets with equal length T as long as the set of possible values of f and
f′ is restricted to QT.
Observe that for each selection hT, we have:
hT
 
(ci)
T
 
=
 
c∈C s(c) ˆ pT (c)f(ci)T (c)
 
c∈C s(c)f(ci)T (c)
= ˆ pT (ci)
and deﬁne
ˆ PT (ci) = HT
 
(ci)
T
 
33Note that, for i and j ∈ {1...|C|}we can write:

 ci...ci       
T−1-times
;cj


T
=
 
(ci)
T
 T−1
◦ (cj)
T
and conclude, by (A2) and Lemma A.3 that
HT

 ci...ci       
(T−1)-times
;cj

 = λHT
 
(ci)
T
 
+ (1 − λ)HT
 
(cj)
T
 
.
for some λ ∈ (0;1). Lemma A.4 shows that the same values of λ can be used for each selection
hT of HT. And (A2) guarantees that for any k ∈ Z+,

 ci...ci       
T−1-times
;cj


kT
=
 
(ci)
T
 k(T−1)
◦ (cj)
kT
implies
HkT

 ci...ci       
k(T−1)-times
;cj...cj       
k-times

 = λHT
 
(ci)
T
 
+ (1 − λ)HT
 
(cj)
T
 
.
Letting k = Tm = m! and m → ∞, we get:
lim
Tm→∞
H

 ci...ci       
Tm(T−1)-times
;cj...cj       
Tm-times

 = λH∞((ci)
∞) + (1 − λ)H∞ ((cj)
∞)
and from Lemma A.6, we know that:
λh∞ ((ci)
∞) + (1 − λ)h∞ ((cj)
∞) =
T−1
T s(ci) ˆ p∞(ci) + 1
Ts(cj) ˆ p∞(cj)
T−1
T s(ci) + 1
Ts(cj)
for each selection h∞ ∈ H∞.
Hence, we can determine the similarity function for data-sets of length T by solving the system
of equations:
T−1
T s(c1) ˆ pT (c1) + 1
Ts(c2) ˆ pT (c2)
T−1
T s(c1) + 1
Ts(c2)
= λ
1h
 
(c1)
T
 
+
 
1 − λ
1 
h
 
(c2)
T
 
...
T−1
T s
 
c|C|−1
 
ˆ pT
 
c|C|−1
 
+ 1
Ts
 
c|C|
 
ˆ pT
 
c|C|
 
T−1
T s
 
c|C|−1
 
+ 1
Ts
 
c|C|
 
= λ
|C|−1h
  
c|C|−1
 T 
+
 
1 − λ
|C|−1
  
h(c|C|)
T
 
in which the λ-values are identical to those in equation A-3 above. Since the selections hT
34satisfy properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition A.1 restricted to QT and since the argument from
the proof of Proposition 3 in BGSS (2005) used above does not depend on the set QT, we can
use it again to claim that the unique solution to this system coincides with the solution of A-3
and is also independent of the values of ˆ pT (c) as long as
ˆ pT (ci) = h
 
(ci)
T
 
holds. Hence, we can use the similarity function determined for D∞, for any DT with T < ∞.￿
Proof of Lemma 6.1:
Suppose that the frequency of r in a data-set D =
 
(x;a;rt)
T
t=1
 
is given by fD (r). Consider
the sequence of data-sets Dk as k → ∞ and note that by (A4), as k → ∞,
H (D
∞) → {h(D
∞)} = {fDk (r)} = {fD∞ (r)}.
By (A5), for each k,
H
 
D
k 
⊂ H
 
D
k−1 
.
Hence, for each k, there is an h ∈ H
 
Dk 
such that
hr (D) = fDk (r).
Especially, for k = 1, there is an h ∈ H (D) such that
hr (D) = fD (r). ￿
Proof of Theorem 6.2:
To simplify notation, for this proof, we let c
x;a
i denote a case (x;a;ri), where only the outcome
r varies while x and a remain ﬁxed. To see that the proposition holds note that we construct the
elements of ˆ PT (c
x;a
i | x;a) by using only the data-set (c
x;a
i )
T and setting for each selection h,
ˆ pT (c
x;a
i | x;a) =: h
 
(c
x;a
i )
T | x;a
 
.
Hence,
ˆ PT (c
x;a
i | x;a) = H
 
(c
x;a
i )
T | x;a
 
.
(A5), Accumulation of knowledge ascertains that
HT+1
 
(c
x;a
i )
T+1 | x;a
 
⊂ HT
 
(c
x;a
i )
T | x;a
 
. ￿
35Now note that, if Axiom (A4), Learnability, holds, we know that for c
x;a
i = (x;a;ri)
H ((c
x;a
i )
∞ | x;a) = fDi
∞ =

0;0...0; 1     
ith-position
;0...0

 = ˆ P
i
∞((c
x;a
i ) | x;a).
The inclusion property shown above ascertains that

0;0...0; 1     
ith-position
;0...0

 ∈ ˆ PT (c
x;a
i | x;a)
for every T. Now consider all cases (x;a;r)r∈R and the data sets (x;a;r)
∞. For any two such
sets with outcomes ri and rj, we know that
H ((x;a;ri)
∞ ◦ (x;a;rj)
∞ | x;a) = f(x;a;ri)∞◦(x;a;rj)∞ =
=
1
2
H ((x;a;ri)
∞ | x;a) +
+
1
2
H ((x;a;rj)
∞ | x;a) =
=
1
2
f(x;a;ri)∞ +
1
2
f(x;a;rj)∞ =
=

 
0;0...
1
2     
ith position
;0...
1
2     
jth position
;0...0

 

Now, expressing
H ((x;a;ri)
∞ ◦ (x;a;rj)
∞ | x;a)
in terms of similarity gives:

 
0;0...
1
2     
ith position
;0...
1
2     
jth position
;0...0

 

=
1
2s((x;a);(x;a;ri))ei + 1
2s((x;a);(x;a;rj))ej
1
2s((x;a);(x;a;ri)) + 1
2s((x;a);(x;a;ri))
,
which implies
s((x;a);(x;a;ri)) = s((x;a);(x;a;rj)),
for all ri, rj ∈ R, which after normalization can be written as:
s((x;a);(x;a;r)) = 1
for all r ∈ R. ￿
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